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1960] RECENT CASES 201
by an officer-o or the court.2 0 Thus an affirmative showing of prejudice can be
required21 and substantial compliance with the statute is sufficient.22 In this
regard the particular wording of the statute may be determinative.23  How-
ever it has been stated as an over-riding premise that the duty of selecting
persons to act as jurors cannot be delegated.24
In summary it may be said that though the courts may state as a principle
that there must be strict compliance with the statutes in jury selection25 in
their application to the summoning of talesmen a good measure of discretion
is given the court and its officers.
J. PHILLIP JOHNSON.
LIBEL - QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE - DOES A MERCANTILE AGENCY ENJOY A
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE. - Plaintiff sought to recover from defendant credit
agency for falsely reporting to an insurance company to which plaintiff was
applying for insurance that plaintiff was an excessive drinker. The complaint
made no allegation of actual malice. The trial judge sustained a demurrer to
the action. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held, in part, that without an
allegation of actual malice the complaint did not state a cause of action because
the credit agency had a conditional privilege. The dissent felt that the in-
formation in this case was volunteered and the conditional privilege should
apply only to requested information. Barker v. Retail Credit Co., 100 N.W.2d
391 (Wisc. 1960).
The vast majority of the courts have held that a mercantile agency has a
qualified privilege to communicate information to a subscriber, who has a
genuine interest in such information;' however, the communication is not
privileged if actual malice can be shown. 2 Malice has been implied by some
19. Cravens v. United States, 62 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S.
733, (1933). See Trapper v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. 53, 84 S.W.2d 726 (1935).
20. Begeman v. Smith, 94 Ind. App. 513, 154 N.E. 806 (1927).
21. Morgan v. Sun Oil Co., 109 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 640
(1940); State v. Burris'. 204 La. 608. 16 So.2d 124 (1944).
22. City of Holdenville v. Deer, 191 Okla. 691, 132 P.2d 928 (1943). See State v.
Hailey, 350 Mo. 300, 165 S.W.2d 422 (1942).
23. People v. Kelhoffer, 181 Misc. 731, 48 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1943) (Legislative sub-
stitution of the word "may" for the word "shall" made the method of selection per-
mussive rather than mandatory). See also N.D. Rev. Code §§ 29-1709 and 29-1713
(1943) (Selection of talesmen-criminal procedure) which provide: ". . . the court
inay order the sheriff to summon . . ."; N.D. Rev. Code § 27-0921 (1943) (Selection of
talesmen--civil procedure) providing: ". . . the court shall order the sheriff, deputy
sheriff, or coroner to summon . . ."
24. Dunn v. United States, 238 Fed. 508 (5th Cir. 1917). But see, Collazo v. United
States, 196 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
25. E.g., State v. Kelly, 100 Conn. 727, 125 Atl. 95 (1924); Kitchen v. Common-
wealth, 275 Ky. 564, 122 S.W.2d 121 (1938); State v. McGoldrick, 361 Mo. 737, 236
S.W.2d 306 (1951).
1. H. E. Crawford Company v. Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., 241 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.
1957); Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency, Inc., 194 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1952);
Pomeroy v. Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., 146 F.Supp. 59 (D. Ore. 1956); Pollasky v.
Minchener, 81 Mich. 280, 46 N.W. 5 (1890); Ormsby v. Douglass, 37 N.Y. 477 (1868);
Cullum v. Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., 228 S.C. 384, 90 S.E.2d 370 (1955).
2. H. E. Crawford Company v. Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., 241 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.
1957); Omsby v. Douglass, 37 N.Y. 477 (1868); Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 208 S.C.
490, 38 S.E.2d 643 (1946) (Ordinarily, proof of defamatory publication. makes out a
prima facie case of malice, but a privileged communication is an exception to the rule
requiring plaintiff to show malice in fact).
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courts in cases of gross negligence, 3 recklessness, 4 wantonness,5 or knowledge
that the information is false.6
The privilege has also been lost if the defendant sends the information to
non-subscribers,7 or voluntarily to subscribers,$ or if the information is not
relevant to the interests of the subscribers, 9 or if the purpose of the report is to
coerce payment.1 0
A few court have held that if the defendant transmits the information in a
negligent fashion" or does not use reasonable care in its collection12 the
privilege is lost. The Restatement of Torts 13 takes the position that there is
a privilege, but negligent communication or investigation will destroy it. But
most cases have denied that negligence can be made the equivalent of malice, 14
and if the libel cannot stand alone because of privilege, negligence will not
help the plaintiff.15 These courts argue that negligent statements are action-
able only in cases of privity between the parties, or when the plaintiff intends
to act upon the statement and the defendant has knowledge of that fact."'
There are cases which hold that there is no qualified privilege at all for
credit agencies,1 7 though some provide recovery on proof of special damages.' s
The argument in these holdings has often been that the defendant has no
moral duty to transmit the information but is doing so simply as a business.10
Qualified privilege for merchantile agencies has been rejected in the British
Commonwealth. -'  The British feel that credit agencies have no legal or
moral duty to transmit the information, and that by setting themselves up in
business they are actually volunteering the information by soliciting for sub-
3. Cullum v. Dun and Bradsteet, Inc., 228 S.C. 384, 90 S.E.2d 370 (1955). See
H. E. Crawford Company v. Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., 241 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1957).
4. Mil-Hall Textile Co., Inc. v. Dun and Bradstreet, 160 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
5. A.B.C. Needle Craft Co., Inc. v. Dun and Bradstreet, 245 F.2d 775 (2nd Cir. 1957).
6. Froslee v. Lund's State Bank of Vining, 131 Minn. 435, 155 N.W. 619 (1915).
7. Hanschke v. Merchant's Credit Bureau, 256 Mich. 272, 239 N.W. 318 (1931).
Accord, King v. Patterson, 49 N.J.L. 417, 9 Atl. 705 (1887) (Creditor, a non sub-
scriber, did not actually receive the report but obtained the information from a sub-
scriber who had no interest in plaintiff's affairs, and creditors relied on the false infor-
mation).
8. Trussell v. Scarlett, 18 Fed. 214 (C.C.D.Md. 1882) (A general publication to
subscribers is not privileged). Cf., Erber and Strickler v. R. G. Dun and Co., 12 Fed.
526 (C.C.E.D.Ark. 1882) (which implies that volunteered information, to a party having
no interest in it, is not privileged).
9. Erber and Strickler v. R. G. Dun and Co., 12 Fed. 526 (C.C.E.D.Ark 1882);
King v. Patterson, 49 N.J.L. 417, 9 At. 705 (1887). See Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co.,
116 Mo. 226, 22 S.W. 358 (1893) (where a false publication was sent to all sub-
scribers of the agency without regard to their being creditors of the firm).
10. Ideal Motor Co. v. Warfield, 211 Ky. 576, 277 S.W. 862 (1925). Accord, J. Hart-
man and Co. v. Hyman, 287 Pa. 78, 134 Atl. 486 (1926) (where the creditor turned in
false information to a credit and collection bureau which was disseminated by that bueau
to its subscribers).
11. Douglass v. Daisley, 114 Fed. 628 (1st Cir. 1902).
12. Locke v. Bradsteet Co., 22 Fed. 771 (C.C.D.Minn. 1885).
13. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 595, comment g (1938).
14. H. E. Crawford Company v. Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., 241 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.
1957).
15. Mil-Hall Textile Co. v. Dun and Bradstreet, 160 F. Supp. 778 ('S.D.N.Y. 1958).
16. Ultramares Corp. v Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E 441 (19,31) (An ironic
situation presents itself as the insurance company in the principle case would have a good
action for negligent misstatement, while the plaintiff in the case, who suffered much more,
is left without a remedy).
17. Johnson v. The Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172 (1886); Pacific Packing Co. v. Brad-
street Co., 25 Idaho 696, 139 Pac. 1007 (1914).
18. Giacona v. Bradstreet Company, 48 La. Ann. 1191, 20 So. 706 (1896); Denney v.
Northwestern Credit Assn., 55 Wash. 331, 104 Pac. 769 (1909).
19. Johnson v. The Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172 (1886).
20. For a general discussion see 24 Can. B. Rev. 545 (1946).
1960] RECENT CASES 203
scribers. 21  It seems that the English point of view-that their only true
duty is to their own self-interest, and consequently that they should not be
allowed any privilege-is by far the sounder.
A recent American criticism of the doctrine of qualified privilege for credit
agencies felt that it should be restricted to non-negligent reports. - As one
court stated this could be done by the legal fiction of implied malice, or by an
honest test of due care and proximate cause. 23
It appears that no real harm or hinderance would be done to these agencies
if they were to be held liable, as they can protect themselves both by due
care and by insurance, and the welfare of the general public can best be
served if these agencies are held to the same standard of care as other busi-
nesses.
DAVID FOSTER KNUTSON.
REAL PROPERTY - TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY - INTEREST OF SURVIVING CO-
TENANT IN ExECUTORY CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LAND. - A husband and wife
owned property as tenants by the entirety. They entered into an executory
contract for the sale of the property with the purchaser, who took possession.
Before the entire purchase price was paid, the husband died intestate. The
Supreme Court of Oregon held, one justice dissenting, that by operation of
the doctrine of equitable conversion the surviving widow succeeded to the
entire legal estate as trustee for the benefit of the purchaser. The intestate
heir of her husband was entitled to one-half the proceeds from the sale of the
property and the surviving spouse the remaining half. Panushka v. Panushka,
349 P.2d 450 (Ore. 1960).
The instant case is indicative of the confusion in this area of the law which
seems to stem from a misguided emphasis upon the doctrine of equitable con-
version.' Actually, the question presented is whether the right of survivorship2
extends to the proceeds of an executory contract for the sale of land.3 The
21. Macintosh v. Dun, (1908) A.C. 390.
22. Note, The Mercantile Agency and Conditional Privilege in Defamation, 11 S.C.L.Q.
256 (1959) which states that "It must be remembered that.reputation is inherently difficult
to protect. The workings of defamatory words are insidious and deadly. Even though there
may in most instances be no reason to equate want of due care with malice, where there
is a private enterprise voluntarily dealing continuously in the reputation and financial
standing of others by subjecting them to the scrutiny of interested subscribers, carelessness
is essentially as blameworthy as a conscious and purposeful wrongdoing. If this is so, there
seems no reason to be balked by verbal subtleties."
23. See Douglass v. Daisley, 114 Fed. 628 (lst Cir. 1902).
1. See Stone, Equitable Conversion. by Contract, 13 Colurn. L. Rev. 369 (1913);
Swenson & Degnan, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 466 (1954); Note,
46 Yale L. J. 1077 (1937); Comment, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 1023 (1937).
2. The right of survivorship is characteristic of both the more common modes of
cotenancies, i. e., joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety. In support of this close
analogy, one authority reasons that a tenancy by the entirety is ". . . essentially a form
of joint tenancy, modified by the common law theory that husband and wife are one person."
2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 430 (3d ed. 1939); see Hewitt v. Biege, 183 Kan. 352,
327 P.2d 872 (1958); Hill v. Breeden, 53 Wyo. 125, 79 P.2d 482 (1938).
3. Union & Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hudson, 147 Ark. 7, 227 S.W. 1 (1921); In re
Baker's Estate, 247 Iowa 1380, 78 N.W.2d 863 (1956) (5-4 decision). It seems that
the few jurisdictions which uphold the majority in the instant case, do so by adopting or
confirming a local rule to the effect that tenancies by the entirety do not exist in per-
sonal property. However, other courts have departed from this exception in instances
where the proceeds are derived from land held by the entirety, or joint tenancy. In
Koehring v. Bowman, 194 Ind. 433, 142 N.E. 117 (1924), it was held that ". . . estates
by the entirety do not exist as to personal property except when such property is directly
derived from real estate held by that title . . . as in proceeds arising from the sale o
